{"id":902,"date":"2026-07-26T17:18:56","date_gmt":"2026-07-26T17:18:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/?p=902"},"modified":"2026-07-27T15:05:17","modified_gmt":"2026-07-27T15:05:17","slug":"non-governmental-violent-actors","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/2026\/07\/26\/non-governmental-violent-actors\/","title":{"rendered":"Non governmental violent actors"},"content":{"rendered":"

NGOVA – NON GOVERNMENTAL VIOLENT ACTORS<\/span><\/h1>\n

NON STATE VIOLENT ACTORS<\/p>\n

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT FUNDED VIOLENT ACTORS<\/span><\/h1>\n

FOGOFUVIAs\u00a0<\/span><\/h1>\n

FUGOFU – FOREIGN GOVERNMENT FUNDER<\/p>\n

US President Donald Trump has acknowledged that Washington tried to send weapons to Iranian demonstrators via Kurdish intermediaries during the winter protests.<\/p>\n

Aljazeera.com 26\/07\/2026 = Breaking news<\/p>\n

(IRGC says it\u2019s acting against US-backed separatist groups<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Ir an\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) says it\u2019s moving to \u201cnip in the bud\u201d separatist and opposition groups it accuses of trying to infiltrate the country\u2019s northwest, casting recent military operations there as a pre-emptive strike against US-backed unrest.<\/p>\n

IRGC spokesperson Brigadier-General Hossein Mohebbi said Tehran is alert to what he called an \u201cenemy plan\u201d to reorganise anti-government factions, including the exiled\u00a0Mojahden-e-Khalq<\/a>, to reignite deadly protests that swept Iran in December and January.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhat we are doing in the northwest is to nip them in the bud before they enter,\u201d Mohebbi told the semi-official Tasnim news agency.<\/p>\n

He said the IRGC\u2019s focus on the Strait of Hormuz, where it has been locked in a confrontation with the United States, had not left it blind to other threats.<\/p>\n

US President Donald Trump has acknowledged that Washington tried to send weapons to Iranian demonstrators via Kurdish intermediaries during the winter protests. )<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Shadows of Influence: How Foreign State Sponsoring Drives Modern Proxy Violence<\/h2>\n

In international relations, direct military confrontation between major powers has largely been replaced by a more insidious alternative: proxy warfare<\/b>. Instead of deploying their own troops, state actors increasingly fund, arm, and enable violent non-state actors (VNSAs)\u2014ranging from paramilitary groups and insurgent militias to extremist organizations\u2014to project power and destabilize rivals without triggering direct warfare.<\/span><\/p>\n

Understanding how this funding works, why states rely on it, and what it means for global security is critical in navigating modern geopolitics.<\/p>\n

Why States Fund External Violent Actors<\/h3>\n

Direct warfare carries immense financial, diplomatic, and human costs. Subsidizing third-party violent actors allows governments to achieve strategic objectives while minimizing those risks.<\/p>\n

Key motivations include:<\/p>\n

    \n
  • \n

    Plausible Deniability:<\/b> By operating through intermediaries, state sponsors can attempt to evade international sanctions, legal liability, and direct military retaliation.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Cost-Effective Destabilization:<\/b> Funding a local militia or extremist group requires a fraction of the budget needed to deploy a conventional army, yet it can tie down targeted adversaries in costly, prolonged conflicts.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Asymmetric Advantage:<\/b> Smaller or conventionally weaker states can use proxy networks to exert influence far beyond their borders, rivaling major regional powers.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  • \n

    Information & Social Warfare:<\/b> Modern state sponsorship often extends beyond physical weapons to include digital support\u2014amplifying extremist narratives, coordinating bot networks, and funding disinformation campaigns designed to provoke domestic civil unrest.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Mechanics of the Shadow Economy<\/h3>\n

    How does a foreign government transfer funds, arms, and resources to non-state violent actors without detection? State sponsors utilize diverse channels:<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Mechanism<\/strong><\/td>\nDescription<\/strong><\/td>\nPurpose<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Front Companies & Shell Shells<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nSetting up commercial entities in neutral jurisdictions.<\/span><\/td>\nConceals the paper trail of financial transactions.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Illicit Trade & Smuggling<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nFacilitating weapons, oil, or narcotics trade through porous borders.<\/span><\/td>\nGenerates self-sustaining revenue for proxy groups.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Informal Value Transfer (Hawala)<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nReliance on traditional, unmonitored money-transfer networks.<\/span><\/td>\nBypasses international banking sanctions.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Cryptocurrency & Cyber Assets<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nLeveraging pseudonymous digital assets.<\/span><\/td>\nMoves funds rapidly across borders without intermediate oversight.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

    The Consequences: Why Proxy Warfare Escalates Chaos<\/h3>\n

    While sponsoring foreign violent actors might offer temporary strategic advantages to the state funder, the broader consequences are almost universally destructive:<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. \n

      Prolonged Conflict Duration:<\/b> Studies consistently show that conflicts involving state-funded proxies last significantly longer and prove far harder to resolve via peace negotiations.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    2. \n

      Erosion of State Sovereignty:<\/b> Constant reliance on armed non-state groups undermines local governments, creating “lawless zones” where organized crime and extremism flourish.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    3. \n

      Severe Civilian Impact:<\/b> Proxies rarely abide by international humanitarian standards or laws of armed conflict, often resulting in widespread displacement and civilian harm.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Countering State-Sponsored Violence<\/h3>\n

      Addressing this issue requires shifting focus from merely fighting the proxy group on the ground to targeting the underlying financial and diplomatic pipelines. Effective counter-strategies rely on targeted financial sanctions<\/b>, enhanced cyber intelligence<\/b>, cross-border law enforcement cooperation<\/b>, and attributing covert operations publicly<\/b> to strip away plausible deniability.<\/p>\n

      As global competition shifts toward the “gray zone” between peace and open war, exposing and disrupting foreign state funding remains one of the most vital tasks for international security.<\/p>\n

      International law handles proxy state accountability through the framework of <\/span>State Responsibility<\/span><\/b> (codified primarily in the UN International Law Commission\u2019s <\/span>Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts<\/span><\/i>, or ARSIWA).<\/span><\/p>\n

      Because states rarely admit to directing non-state armed groups, international courts rely on specific legal tests to determine when a proxy\u2019s illegal acts can be attributed directly to a foreign government.<\/p>\n

      1. The Core Legal Issue: Attribution<\/h2>\n

      Under international law, private citizens or non-state armed groups are not state organs.<\/span> For a state to be held legally accountable for a proxy group\u2019s atrocities or military actions, international courts must find a sufficient <\/span>nexus of control<\/span><\/b> between the state and the proxy.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The legal battleground centers on how high that threshold of “control” should be.<\/p>\n

      2. The Competing Standards of Control<\/h2>\n

      A. The “Effective Control” Standard (The ICJ Baseline)<\/h3>\n

      Established by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the landmark Nicaragua v. United States (1986)<\/span><\/i> case and reaffirmed in the <\/span>Bosnian Genocide Case (2007)<\/span><\/i>, this is the highest legal threshold:<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
      • \n

        The Rule:<\/b> Providing general financing, training, weapons, and logistics to a group is <\/span>not enough<\/span><\/b> to attribute the group\u2019s illegal acts to the state.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        The Threshold:<\/b> The sponsoring state must have had effective control<\/b> over the specific operations<\/i> in which the alleged violations took place. The state must have essentially issued direct instructions for the specific illegal act.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      • \n

        Impact:<\/b> This standard makes it difficult to legally hold state sponsors liable for war crimes committed by their proxies unless “smoking gun” evidence proves direct operational orders.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        B. The “Overall Control” Standard (The ICTY Alternative)<\/h3>\n

        Developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v. Tadi\u0107 (1999)<\/span><\/i>, this test set a lower bar:<\/span><\/p>\n

          \n
        • \n

          The Rule:<\/b> For organized armed groups, a state is accountable if it exercises <\/span>overall control<\/span><\/b>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        • \n

          The Threshold:<\/b> The state does not need to issue specific orders for each operation.<\/span> It is enough that the state equips, finances, and assists in the overall planning or coordination of the military group’s activities.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        • \n

          Impact:<\/b> Makes state attribution far easier to prove in proxy conflicts.<\/span> However, the ICJ has repeatedly declined to adopt this standard for general state responsibility, keeping “effective control” as the prevailing standard.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

          3. Alternative Avenues for Accountability<\/h2>\n

          When direct legal attribution of the proxy’s acts fails under the “effective control” test, international law offers secondary paths to hold sponsoring states accountable:<\/p>\n

          1. Breach of Independent Duties<\/h3>\n

          Even if a proxy\u2019s specific war crimes cannot be attributed to the sponsor, the sponsor state itself breaches distinct international law obligations simply by providing aid:<\/span><\/p>\n

            \n
          • \n

            Prohibition on the Use of Force & Non-Intervention:<\/b> Arming or training rebels fighting against another recognized government inherently violates customary international law.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

          • \n

            Duty to Prevent Genocide:<\/b> Under the Genocide Convention, states can be held liable not for committing genocide directly, but for failing to use their influence to prevent<\/i> a proxy group from carrying out genocidal acts.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

            2. Complicity in Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA Article 16)<\/h3>\n

            A state that knowingly provides material assistance or aid that facilitates another entity\u2019s breach of international law can be held internationally responsible for complicity<\/b>, independent of direct command.<\/p>\n

            The Gray Zone Paradox<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
            Mechanism<\/strong><\/td>\nLegal Reality<\/strong><\/td>\nPractical Challenge<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
            Direct Attribution<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nRequires proving effective control<\/i> over specific ops.<\/span><\/td>\nHigh evidentiary bar; proxy groups operate with tactical autonomy.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Indirect Breach<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nCovers illegal funding, arming, or training.<\/span><\/td>\nPenalties often remain political or economic rather than enforceable judicial reparations.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

            This high evidentiary bar creates a “gray zone” where states strategically use proxies to achieve tactical goals while remaining just below the threshold required for legal responsibility.<\/p>\n

            Think of the gray zone<\/b> as a deliberate loophole in international law\u2014a legal sweet spot where foreign states can cause maximum chaos for an adversary while leaving their own hands legally clean.<\/p>\n

            Here is how states intentionally engineer and exploit that gap, step by step:<\/p>\n

            1. The Strategy: Hitting Without Getting Caught<\/h3>\n

            Under international law, if Country A fires a missile into Country B, that is an unambiguous act of war (aggression<\/i>). Country B can legally retaliate with direct military force under UN Article 51, and international courts can hold Country A accountable.<\/p>\n

            To bypass this, Country A uses a proxy (like an insurgent group or militia).<\/p>\n

            They supply the proxy with:<\/p>\n

              \n
            • \n

              Weapons and ammunition<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

            • \n

              Satellite intelligence and logistics<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

            • \n

              Funding and safe havens<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

              Because the proxy pulls the trigger, Country A creates plausible deniability<\/b>.<\/p>\n

              2. The Legal Trap: The High “Effective Control” Bar<\/h3>\n

              This is where the high evidentiary threshold comes in. As established by international courts, to hold Country A legally responsible for the proxy’s specific war crimes, you have to prove Effective Control<\/b>.<\/p>\n

              \n

              The “Effective Control” Requirement:<\/b> It is not enough to show that Country A paid for the guns, trained the fighters, and pointed them at the target. You must prove that Country A gave the direct, specific command<\/b> for that exact operation or crime.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

              Because state sponsors almost never put specific illegal orders in writing\u2014and because proxy leaders maintain day-to-day tactical autonomy\u2014this is virtually impossible to prove in a court of law.<\/p>\n

              3. Exploiting the Gap: The “Gray Zone” in Practice<\/h3>\n

              Here is how a state stays safely below the legal line while achieving its strategic goals:<\/p>\n

              \n
              \n
              \n
              [ Full Direct Attack ]  ---> Illegal, triggers direct war & sanctions\r\n         |\r\n      (THE GRAY ZONE)  ---> Arming, funding, & providing intelligence to proxies\r\n         |                   - Achieves military goals\r\n         |                   - Destabilizes target state\r\n         |                   - Escapes direct legal liability\r\n         v\r\n[ Absolute Non-Involvement ] ---> Ineffective for projecting power\r\n<\/code><\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
                \n
              • \n
                The Proxy’s Action:<\/b> A proxy militia shells a civilian hospital or blows up infrastructure in Country B.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
              • \n
                Country B’s Evidence:<\/b> Country B finds Country A\u2019s weapons at the scene, intercept transmissions showing Country A paid the militia’s salaries, and proves Country A provided radar tracking for the target.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
              • \n
                The Legal Outcome:<\/b> International legal standards say Country A is guilty of interfering<\/i> or unlawfully arming a group<\/i>, but not guilty<\/b> of the shelling or war crime itself.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
                Why It Matters<\/h3>\n
                By keeping their involvement strictly within this “gray zone,” sponsoring states get the best of both worlds:<\/p>\n
                  \n
                1. \n
                  Strategic Success:<\/b> They tie down their rival, destroy infrastructure, and expand their influence.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
                2. \n
                  Legal Immunity:<\/b> They avoid formal declarations of war, escape massive court-ordered reparations, and frustrate international enforcement mechanisms.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                  In short, the gray zone isn’t a bug in the international legal system\u2014for aggressor states, it’s a feature.<\/b><\/p>\n
                  Because foreign support for violent non-state actors (VNSAs) often involves covert ops, dual funding streams, and shifting alliances, no single static list covers every group globally. However, intelligence agencies, governments, and international security organizations categorize foreign-funded violent actors into distinct primary operational networks.<\/p>\n
                  1. Middle East & North Africa (The “Axis of Resistance” & Regional Proxies)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                  Actor \/ Group<\/strong><\/td>\nprimary Operating Area<\/strong><\/td>\nPrimary Foreign Sponsor(s)<\/strong><\/td>\nOperational Role<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
                  Hezbollah<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nLebanon, Syria<\/span><\/td>\nIran<\/span><\/td>\nSubstantial military, missile technology, and financial backing.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  Ansar Allah (Houthis)<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nYemen, Red Sea<\/span><\/td>\nIran<\/span><\/td>\nAnti-ship ballistic missiles, drones, and technical training.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  Kata’ib Hezbollah \/ Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nIraq, Syria<\/span><\/td>\nIran<\/span><\/td>\nHeavy weaponry, funding, and command integration within the PMF framework.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  Hamas & Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nGaza, West Bank<\/span><\/td>\nIran, Qatar (financial\/political host)<\/i><\/span><\/td>\nFinancial subsidies, rockets, and military infrastructure support.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
                  2. Eastern Europe & Eurasia (State-Controlled Mercenaries & Paramilitaries)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                  Actor \/ Group<\/strong><\/td>\nprimary Operating Area<\/strong><\/td>\nPrimary Foreign Sponsor(s)<\/strong><\/td>\nOperational Role<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
                  Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group)<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nUkraine, Mali, CAR, Libya, Burkina Faso<\/span><\/td>\nRussia<\/span><\/td>\nDirectly funded and controlled state proxy used to secure commercial concessions and military influence.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  1st and 2nd Army Corps (Donbas Militias)<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nEastern Ukraine (Donetsk\/Luhansk)<\/span><\/td>\nRussia<\/span><\/td>\nHeavily armed proxy forces integrated into state military operations.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  SADAT International Defense Consultancy<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nSyria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh<\/span><\/td>\nTurkey<\/span><\/td>\nPrivate military contractor acting as an informal proxy trainer\/broker for Syrian opposition fighters.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
                  3. Sub-Saharan Africa (Insurgent Networks & Private Contractors)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                  Actor \/ Group<\/strong><\/td>\nprimary Operating Area<\/strong><\/td>\nPrimary Foreign Sponsor(s)<\/strong><\/td>\nOperational Role<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
                  M23 Movement<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC)<\/span><\/td>\nRwanda (per UN Security Council reports)<\/i><\/span><\/td>\nAdvanced weapons, intelligence, and logistical support in eastern DRC.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  Rapid Support Forces (RSF)<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nSudan<\/span><\/td>\nUAE (per UN Panel of Experts & intelligence reports)<\/i><\/span><\/td>\nArms shipments, vehicle supply lines, and financial networks through regional trade.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  SPLA-IO & Regional Rebel Factions<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nSouth Sudan, CAR<\/span><\/td>\nUganda, Sudan (historically reciprocal proxy support)<\/i><\/span><\/td>\nCross-border safe havens, arms supply, and political backing.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
                  4. South & Central Asia<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                  Actor \/ Group<\/strong><\/td>\nprimary Operating Area<\/strong><\/td>\nPrimary Foreign Sponsor(s)<\/strong><\/td>\nOperational Role<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
                  Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) & Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nJammu & Kashmir, India<\/span><\/td>\nPakistan (ISI \/ state intelligence backdoors)<\/i><\/span><\/td>\nHistorical safe havens, intelligence support, and infiltration assistance.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  Haqqani Network<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nAfghanistan, Pakistan border<\/span><\/td>\nPakistan (historical sanctuary\/logistics)<\/i><\/span><\/td>\nActs as an autonomous wing of the Afghan Taliban with historical cross-border state backchannels.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
                  5. Historical & Latam Precedents (Cold War to Present)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                  Actor \/ Group<\/strong><\/td>\nprimary Operating Area<\/strong><\/td>\nPrimary Foreign Sponsor(s)<\/strong><\/td>\nOperational Role<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
                  The Contras<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nNicaragua (1980s)<\/span><\/td>\nUnited States<\/span><\/td>\nCovert arms, financing, and tactical training via intelligence channels.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  National Liberation Army (ELN)<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nColombia, Venezuela border<\/span><\/td>\nVenezuela<\/span><\/td>\nSafe havens, sanctuary, and tacit intelligence cooperation.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  FNLA \/ UNITA<\/b><\/span><\/td>\nAngola (1970s\u20131980s)<\/span><\/td>\nUSA, South Africa, Zaire<\/span><\/td>\nForeign-backed insurgency opposed to the Soviet\/Cuban-funded MPLA government.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
                  Key Takeaway on State Attribution<\/h3>\n
                  International monitoring bodies (such as the UN Security Council, Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and US State Department) classify foreign support into three main levels:<\/p>\n
                    \n
                  1. \n
                    State-Created Proxies:<\/b> Built, paid, and operated directly by foreign intelligence (e.g., Africa Corps\/Wagner).<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
                  2. \n
                    State-Assisted Insurgencies:<\/b> Pre-existing local groups receiving heavy funding, high-end weaponry, and sanctuary (e.g., Houthis, Hezbollah).<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
                  3. \n
                    Tactical Beneficiaries:<\/b> Autonomous militant\/terrorist groups receiving opportunistic financial or logistical backing from regional rivals to disrupt a mutual enemy.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                     <\/p>\n
                    \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\" \"\"<\/p>\n
                    \"\"<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
                    NGOVA – NON GOVERNMENTAL VIOLENT ACTORS NON STATE VIOLENT ACTORS FOREIGN GOVERNMENT FUNDED VIOLENT ACTORS FOGOFUVIAs\u00a0 FUGOFU – FOREIGN GOVERNMENT FUNDER US President Donald Trump has acknowledged that Washington tried…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":927,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/902"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=902"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/902\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":928,"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/902\/revisions\/928"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/927"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=902"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=902"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shahed.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=902"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}